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Abstract 
 
Bunge (2000) distinguishes two main methodological approaches of holism and 
individualism, and associates with them policy prescriptions of centralism and laissez-
faire.  He identifies systemism as a superior approach to both the study and 
management of society.  The present paper, seeking to correct and develop this line of 
thought, suggests a more complex relation between policy and methodology.  There 
are two possible methodological underpinnings for laissez-faire: while writers such as 
Friedman and Lucas fit Bunge’s pattern, more sophisticated advocates of laissez-faire, 
such as Smith and Hayek, base their policy prescription in a methodology quite 
divergent from the individualism Bunge describes.   
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This paper is a response to Mario Bunge (2000) ‘Systemism: the alternative to 
individualism and holism’.  Bunge’s article makes a number of telling points and is 
evidence of a growing discomfort with the reductionism of the neoclassical school 
currently hegemonic within the discipline of economics.  The present paper is in 
agreement with much of the substance of Bunge’s article, seeking to correct and 
develop the line of thought he sets out. 
 
Bunge’s thesis is, firstly, that there are three fundamental research approaches in the 
social sciences: the two most influential, individualism and holism, being fatally 
flawed, with only the minority approach of systemism offering a viable way forward.  
Secondly, the relation between the three methodological approaches is mirrored by 
that between the three corresponding policy prescriptions associated with them: 
methodological individualism being associated with a policy individualism blind to 
social values, methodological holism with a policy centralism devoid of respect for 
the individual, and systemism with a mild form of intervention respectful of both 
individual and social values.   
 
I suggest in this paper that the relation between policy prescription and philosophical 
standpoint in political economy is more complex than Bunge implies.  In particular, 
there is more than one possible methodological underpinning for laissez-faire.  As 
well as writers such as Friedman and Lucas who fit Bunge’s pattern, more 
sophisticated proponents of laissez-faire, such as Smith and Hayek, base their policy 
prescription in a methodology quite divergent from the individualism Bunge 
describes.   
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As the title of Bunge’s article implies, the two methodological approaches at the 
extremes of the continuum he describes are individualism and holism.  They are 
inadequate, he argues, because each manages to avoid the other’s error only by 
committing an opposite error of its own.  For Bunge, ‘holism’ is inadequate ‘because 
there are no relations without relata’; and ‘individualism’ so ‘because all individuals 
are interrelated’(1471):   
 
“Neither of the two most influential approaches to the study and management of 
social affairs is completely adequate … individualism is deficient because it 
underrates or even overlooks the bonds among people, and holism, because it 
plays down or even enslaves individual action.  By contrast, systemism makes 
room for both agency and structure.” (156-157) 
 
Systemism, Bunge suggests, manages to synthesise the other two approaches, 
accepting the criticism each makes of the other.  Apart from being defined negatively 
with respect to individualism and holism, systemism is characterised by viewing the 
world from a systems perspective: ‘everything is either a system or a component of a 
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system and every system has peculiar (emergent) properties that its components lack’ 
(147).   
 
Bunge thus rejects holism as ignoring the fact that the relations, of which our systems 
of relations consist, depend fundamentally upon the material properties of the relata, 
the substrate-level entities which are doing the relating.  But in doing so he is 
implicitly defining an anti-holist, or at least non-holist approach, which is shared by 
both individualism and systemism.  It is also the case that Bunge criticises 
individualism for failing to take into consideration the relationships between agents, 
and the emergence of properties at the macro, or system level.  But, again, in doing so 
he implicitly defines a non-individualist approach shared by both systemism and 
holism.  Bunge’s systemism thus lies at the intersection of the non-holistic and non-
individualistic approaches.  It is the latter contrast, between individualist and non-
individualist methodological approaches with which the present paper is mainly 
concerned. 
 
On the basis of this methodological analysis, Bunge proposes a corresponding 
typology of policy recommendations.  He takes a clear stance on the relationship 
between methodology and policy:  those on the right of the spectrum of policy views, 
those advocating laissez-faire, are more likely to appeal to individualist 
methodological premises, while those on the left, those adopting a more 
interventionist stance, are more likely to invoke holistic underpinnings for their policy 
pronouncements.  He speaks of the ‘obsolete individualism of … Smith … [and] the 
neoclassical economists’ (147); ‘the cultural policy of liberalism, which is based on 
individualism, is one of benign neglect.  By contrast, the totalitarian cultural policy, 
which is based on holism, is one of censorship’ (150-151); ‘all market worshippers 
espouse individualism’ (151).  ‘The radical individualists oppose all social planning in 
the name of individual liberties … holists swear by top-down planning … they are 
likely to ignore their aspirations and rights [sc those of the common people].  In either 
case, the powerless individual, whether forsaken or corralled, has nothing to gain’ 
(153).  By contrast, ‘systemism takes into account social values (ignored by 
individualism) as well as individual values (ignored by holism)’ (157).   
 
There is much to be said for this account.  While there may not be a tight, one-to-one 
relationship between methodological standpoint and policy prescription, nevertheless, 
there certainly are policy implications of the choice between individualism, systemism 
and holism.  If, for example, one were to adopt a non-individualistic approach and 
recognise that the unintended collective outcomes of an unplanned, uncoordinated 
mass of individual self-seeking actions might have far from desirable features, then 
the obvious implication would be to see whether there is anything that could be done 
about it.  The individualist approach, on the contrary, says that, assuming individuals 
can be counted on to optimise, to do the best they can for themselves given the 
constraints they face, the aggregate outcome of those individual actions will also be in 
some sense the best available: state intervention in the economy is nugatory. 
 
These two approaches can be illustrated by reference to Maynard Keynes and Robert 
Lucas.  Keynes, for example, clearly advocates a non-individualist, indeed a systems 
approach: 
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“I have called my theory a general theory.  I mean by this that I am chiefly 
concerned with the behaviour of the economic system as a whole .... And I argue 
that important mistakes have been made through extending to the system as a 
whole conclusions which have been correctly arrived at in respect of a part of it 
taken in isolation.” (Keynes, 1973: xxxii) 
 
Keynes sets out very clearly here what he takes to be the distinguishing feature of the 
two approaches: that, on the one hand, we can derive correct conclusions from the 
study of microeconomic phenomena ‘taken in isolation’, but that to extend those 
conclusions to macroeconomic phenomena leads to error, and, on the other, that the 
correct approach is (what we would now call) a systems approach, aiming to examine 
the behaviour of ‘the economic system as a whole’.   
 
Lucas, on the contrary, is a very clear spokesman for the trend in economics which 
favours an individualistic methodology, arguing strongly for ‘the reincorporation of 
aggregative problems such as inflation and the business cycle within the general 
framework of ‘microeconomic’ theory’ (Lucas, 1987: 107).  It is in his view quite 
illegitimate to regard macro phenomena as ‘the province of some other, different kind 
of Economic Theory [such as] Keynesian “macroeconomics”.’  Here we have a clear 
expression of the desire to reduce macroeconomics to microeconomics, and a 
characterisation of the Keynesian approach as ‘abandonment … of the only “engine 
for the discovery of truth” that we have in economics.’    
 
Both these passages cited occur in contexts – a preface to the General Theory, and the 
concluding paragraph of Models of Business Cycles, respectively – where the authors 
are standing back from the detail of the theories that they are presenting, and 
indicating what they regard as the underlying general features of their approaches.  
What they choose to highlight in both cases is their selection of a individualist or anti-
individualist methodological approach.   
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However, there is a problem with this way of looking at things.  A profoundly 
influential trend within political economy, epitomised by advocates of laissez-faire 
such as Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek, has postulated an invisible hand 
mechanism, in which order in human affairs is ‘emergent’, ‘resulting from human 
action but not design’ (De Vany, 1996: 427).  Perhaps the canonical statement of an 
invisible hand mechanism is Smith’s statement that  
 
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.  We address 
ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of 
our own necessities, but of their advantages.”  (Smith, 1976b: I.ii.2) 
 
In this well-known and apparently simple statement, the butcher, brewer and baker do 
not care about the dinners they provide, so that, in some sense, the desirable social 
outcome of feeding the members of society is achieved in spite of rather than because 
of the motives and behaviours of the food providers: the desired social outcome, that 
we be fed, emerges from self-seeking behaviour.  This notion of emergent order 
seems at odds with the proposed association between laissez-faire and methodological 
individualism just noted: Bunge’s typology suggests that individualists fail to 
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recognise interrelationships and bonds between individuals, and that it is the non-
individualist approaches of systemism and holism which are characterised as 
recognising emergence.   
 
The question therefore arises, whether invisible hand mechanisms are consistent with 
the individualist approach.  Haworth (1994) performs an invaluable service by 
addressing precisely this issue.  He identifies two ‘theses’, implicit in libertarian 
thought, which he defines as follows, each illustrated by a statement from a libertarian 
source (Haworth, 1994: 32-34).  Then the libertarians’ logical dilemma arises from 
the mutual incompatibility of the two theses: 
 
The reducibility thesis: the fully developed market economy can be understood as 
the sum or aggregate of its discrete components, the individual bilateral exchanges at 
the micro level.  In evidence of this, Haworth cites Sir Keith Joseph: ‘Since inequality 
arises from the operation of innumerable preferences, it cannot be evil unless those 
preferences are themselves evil.’ 
 
The invisible hand thesis: the market is a ‘paradigmatic exemplar’ of want-
satisfaction (ie, unrestricted market forces leave agents better off than any alternative 
economic environment) because an invisible hand transmutes our self-interested 
behaviour into socially desirable outcomes.  Haworth cites Mandeville as an example: 
‘the grand principle that makes us social creatures, the solid basis, the life and support 
of all trade and employment without exception is evil’. 
 
So the individualist approach, based on considering individuals in isolation and 
ignoring or deprecating their interrelationships, says that an entity cannot display a 
property or quality unless its substrate displays that property: system level properties 
simply reflect substrate level properties – and thereby emergence is excluded – while 
the job of the invisible hand is specifically to transmute a property at the substrate 
level into its opposite – which is therefore necessarily emergent – at the system level.  
For Sir Keith the aggregate outcome cannot be ‘evil’ as long as the preferences it is 
based on are innocent; for Mandeville, on the contrary, the aggregate outcome cannot 
be good unless the preferences underpinning it are ‘evil’.  Thus Haworth is able to 
conclude that the libertarians cannot have it both ways: ‘libertarianism is seriously 
broken backed in the sense that it must abandon one of its central theses’ (Haworth, 
1994: 34). 
 
Howarth’s analysis can be taken further.  There are two possibilities: either we inhabit 
an individualistic or a non-individualistic world – either a world where an entity at 
one level can be understood as a congeries, an aggregate of isolated entities at a lower, 
substrate level, or a world where a higher level entity has to be understood as a 
product of the interrelationships between its component parts.  If we lived in the 
former, the macro level would simply reflect the micro level.  The individual would 
be directly social: there would be no distinct category of the social.  Individual utility 
maximisation would directly be social welfare maximisation: the distinction between 
them would be meaningless.  Likewise, macro irrationality would be just a summary 
of micro irrationality: unemployment would either be a product of irrational behaviour 
by workers, such as ‘pricing themselves out of jobs’, or it would be the product of a 
rational desire for leisure, and, hence, itself rational.  In general, individuals could 
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with confidence be left to get on with it without supervision or intervention.  An 
individualist world would be a laissez-faire world. 
 
If, on the other hand, we were to inhabit a non-individualistic world, then 
individualists would have a problem.  Yet this is the kind of world we actually live in.  
It is fairly obvious that higher level entities are not simply aggregates of their micro 
components: water does not behave as an aggregate of hydrogen and oxygen; steam, 
liquid water, and ice do not consist of tiny gaseous, liquid and solid molecules; nor do 
chairs consist of hard, green, ugly or uncomfortable molecules (Haworth, 1994: 35).  
All these properties emerge at higher levels.  The problem faced by the individualist is 
how to reconcile this fact of an obvious disjuncture between levels with the laissez-
faire policy prescription.  Libertarians face severe difficulties sustaining a logically 
consistent policy individualism in a non-individualist world.   
 
The invisible hand is one potential solution to this problem.  Advocates of laissez-
faire face a choice: either one can ignore the disjuncture between levels, and adopt a 
thoroughgoing individualist methodology and policy stance – this seems to be line 
taken by Joseph in the passage cited above, by Lucas and by Friedman – or with 
Hayek and Adam Smith one can  accept that disjuncture and adopt a non-individualist 
methodology but at the same time postulate a mechanism reconciling that 
methodological non-individualism with a laissez-faire policy individualism.  Such a 
mechanism is an invisible hand mechanism.  The invisible hand allows us to say, 
granted that social outcomes are not logically bound to reflect individual behaviour in 
an aggregative, summary manner, nevertheless a mechanism exists which ensures that 
in practice they do so.  The invisible hand is what allows us to think, and act, in an 
individualist way in a non-individualist world: it underpins individualism by tacitly 
conceding the opposite.  Laissez-faire is vindicated and we are inveigled into tying the 
visible hand behind our back, if we can be persuaded that the invisible hand will do its 
job instead, and do it better.  
 
4 
 
Smith and Hayek tacitly recognise a non-individualistic world by invoking invisible 
hand mechanisms.  Smith and Hayek are methodologically very distant from the 
crudely individualistic methodology of Lucas and Friedman.  Compare the 
standpoints of Hayek and Friedman.  For Friedman, economics is based on the study 
of ‘a number of independent households  a collection of Robinson Crusoes’ 
(Friedman, 1962: 13).  For Hayek, on the contrary, ‘individuals are merely the foci in 
the network of relationships’ (Hayek, 1979: 59).  So Hayek subscribes to a very 
clearly non-individualistic, and Friedman to an equally clearly individualistic 
methodology. Yet they still both endorse the same basic framework for policy of 
laissez-faire.   
 
For Smith the invisible hand is literally the hand of an omniscient and omnipotent 
deity desiring nothing other than the maximisation of human welfare: 
 
“all the inhabitants of the universe, the meanest as well as the greatest, are under 
the immediate care and protection of that great, benevolent, and all-wise being, 
who directs all the movements of nature; and who is determined, by his own 
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unalterable perfections, to maintain in it, at all times, the greatest possible 
quantity of happiness.”  (Smith, 1976a: VI.ii.3.1)   
 
Smith’s standpoint is spelled out in detail in Denis (1999); for a contrary view, 
however, see Pack (1995).   
 
For Hayek, writing in a more secular age, the invisible hand mechanism takes the 
form of an evolutionary process, specifically the group selection theory of VC 
Wynne-Edwards (Hayek, 1967: 70).  Richard Dawkins criticises succinctly the group 
selectionist argument endorsed by Hayek:  
 
“A group, such as a species or a population within a species, whose individual 
members are prepared to sacrifice themselves for the welfare of the group, may 
be less likely to go extinct than a rival group whose individual members place 
their own selfish interests first.  Therefore the world becomes populated mainly 
by groups consisting of self-sacrificing individuals.  This is the theory of ‘group 
selection’ [expressed] in a famous book by V.C. Wynne-Edwards ... [But if] there 
is just one selfish rebel, prepared to exploit the altruism of the rest, then he, by 
definition, is more likely than they are to survive and have children.  Each of 
these children will tend to inherit his selfish traits.  After several generations of 
natural selection, the ‘altruistic group’ will be over-run by selfish individuals, 
and will be indistinguishable from the selfish group.” (Dawkins, 1989: 7-8) 
 
The point is, not that it is impossible for behaviour which leads to desirable 
consequences for the group to emerge, but that such behaviour needs to be 
underpinned by individual incentives.  The theory of group selection – whether in a 
biological or social context – suggests that processes will be selected for when they 
lead to desirable collective outcomes.  But it does not provide any mechanism linking 
those desirable processes to individual interests.  The question, why individuals 
should act in the manner required by the theory, is left unanswered.  For a contrary 
view of Hayek’s evolutionary theory, however, see Whitman (1998).   
 
The alternative to both of these laissez-faire approaches is to combine recognition of 
the non-individualist nature of the world we live in with acceptance that there is no 
invisible hand.  In this view, rational individual self-seeking behaviour is by no means 
the necessary and sufficient micro substrate for the desirability of social outcomes.  
Rather, behaviour must be directly social if desirable social outcomes are to be 
obtained.  According to Keynes, for example, egotistical activity uncoordinated by the 
state may lead to inefficient outcomes.  The price system aggregates rational 
individual actions but the aggregate is an unintended outcome as far as those 
individuals are concerned.  There is no particular reason why unintended outcomes 
should necessarily be desirable and often they are not.  Individuals take responsibility 
for maximising their own welfare, given what everyone else is doing, but society as a 
whole has to take responsibility for organising the aggregate outcome if undesirable 
aggregate outcomes are to be avoided: 
 
“There is no design but our own ... the invisible hand is merely our own bleeding 
feet moving through pain and loss to an uncertain … destination.”  (Keynes, 
1981: 471) 
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5 
 
The laissez-faire policy prescription does, indeed, embody a policy individualism.  
However, there is more than one way of sustaining that standpoint methodologically.  
One can suppose that the world truly is individualist in relevant ways and that 
supposed macro-level pathology is simply the summation of micro-level behaviour 
which may or may not be pathological.  Laissez-faire is an individualist policy 
prescription in the sense that it issues from an individualist methodological 
standpoint.  Or one can accept that the world is non-individualistic and hence that 
macro-level pathologies might in principle be emergent at the macro level, but at the 
same time postulate the existence of an invisible hand mechanism which ensures that 
the individualist policy prescription of laissez-faire is nevertheless valid.   
 
In substance Bunge’s article is a significant contribution to our understanding of the 
methodology of economics – perhaps best embodied in his bold injunction to ‘see 
agency through Weber’s microscope, and structure through Marx’s telescope’ (154).  
The argument of the article, however, can be developed in an important respect.  The 
pronouncements of Friedman, Lucas and Sir Keith fit Bunge’s suggested pattern 
linking laissez-faire policies to individualist methodological presuppositions.  But to 
lump non-individualist writers such as Smith and Hayek in with them, would both be 
mistaken and allow us to ignore the fundamentally ideological  role of invisible hand 
mechanisms in allowing economists to retain some approximation to efficiency as 
their default notion of how the capitalist economy actually works.   
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